This paper aims to understand why similar efforts of state intervention can generate different economic outcomes. It argues that the different economic outcomes of state intervention can be traced back to the different processes of class struggle. Mobilizing Marxist view, it suggests that the state role in the economy should be understood as inseparable from capitalist development. That is, economic development is the terrain for class struggle between capital and labor. Although the contradictory relation between capital and labor is universal and global in capitalism, the form of contradiction will always be different across societies. That is the case because the form of class struggle depends on the specific development of the configuration of class power that has developed historically in each country alongside with its international process due to the expansive nature of capitalism itself.
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Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 3 (2), July 2018, pp. 239-261 240 -rent between the two countries. South Korea has been declared a new developed country in the global economy, while Indonesia's economy is still struggling to be dominant in an international constellation. The difference can be seen on how the two countries compare according to GDP in 1970 and in 2016 . Erken (2017 Robinson (2012) . Through their historical reading, they suggest that the state institution is crucial for "providing economic incentives and prosperity" (Robinson, 2012: 102) . In order for the institution to be supportive of development, its institutional character should be inclusive. For Acemoglu and
Robinson, the inclusivity of the institution must be based on "intense conflict as different groups competed for power, contesting the authority of others, and attempting to structure institution in their own favor" (Robinson, 2012: 102) .
Similar yet different from Acemoglu and
Robinson's proposition is Johnson's (1982) exposition on Japan's development. He suggests that the Japanese government was success in rationally planning development through a strategic, or goal-oriented, approach to the economy" (Johnson, 1982: 19) . While the Japanese government also introduced close collaboration with the domestic business sector, this collaboration was founded under a competitive basis which "stress[ed] rule and reciprocal concession" (Johnson, 1982: 20) related to the overall development goal of the country. It is unsurprising that the economic rationality of the Japanese government required details of "state policy at micro level" (Johnson, 1982: 27) (Evans', 1989: 567) as an important factor that determines the state's successful role in development. Evans' argument is reaffirmed by Skocpol's (1985) which posits that the essence of state autonomy lies in the position of the state "as a set of organizations through which collectivities of officials may be able to formulate and implement distinctive strategies or policies" (Skocpol, 1985: 20-21) . Consequently, Skocpol suggests that the state as organization has a certain capacity to place itself beyond social relation. That is, the degree of the autonomy varies from a "committee of the bourgeoisie' to the absolutely autonomous state" (Chang, 2009: 20 class. This intimacy necessarily leads to the position that the executive committee should be understood as merely the instrument of the capitalist class that usually rules the market (Lenin, 1968; Miliband, 1969; Engels, 1978) .
However, Poulantzas (1980) it suggests no deterministic outcome in the relation between the state and class. Jessop (1990) argues that this non- (Moudud, 2010: 15) .
Rather, capitalist competition imposes every firms to be active in minimizing their unit cost and thus maximizing profit.
Therefore, it is imperative for firms to utilize tactics and strategy in order to hold market share. Price cutting and reduction of cost become the major features of capitalist competition (Shaikh, 1980; Shaikh, 2016 (Bukharin, 1927: 117) .
In here, the competition between those firms which are able to mechanized their productive forces and those firms which countries is known as imperialism (Lenin, 1999 Java to be the primary terrain of political struggle among social forces in Indonesia.
The form of these social forces tends to be arranged according to an ideology that is strongly related to the class structure that arose from the colonial development. The US also reutilized the Korean police that had been trained by the Japanese and were hated by the Korean people (Barone, 1983: 57) . (Kim & Park, 2007: 196) to enable Japan's investment in South Korea. Japan's investment changed the Indonesia's industry (Pratap, 2014) . This 
